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Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin
Business history ought to be an interdisciplinary subject. Because businesses
are first and foremost economic units that make such decisions as how much
of a good to produce, how to make it, and what to charge for it, the "dismal
science" ofeconomics inevitably has a role to play in understanding their be-
havior. At the same time, however, businesses are organizations of people
whose choices are affected by the social and cultural environment in which
they live and work. Hence understanding how businesses operated in the
past-and why they succeeded or failed-is also an interpretive activity that
requires the tools and sensitivity ofhistorical scholarship.
Unfortunately, there is little communication today between economists and
historians or even between economic historians (who are largely economists
by training) and business historians (who typically come out ofhistory depart-
ments). The former have organized themselves into the Economic History As-
sociation; the latter into the Business History Conference. Only a small num-
ber of people attend both sets of meetings. Moreover, the two groups of
scholars largely subscribe to and publish in differentjournals. Economic histo-
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rians read the Journal ofEconomic History and Explorations in Economic His-
tory, and business historians the Business History Review and the conference's
annual publication, Business and Economic History. There are relatively few
articles in either set ofjournals that appeal to both groups ofscholars.
Although this division can be traced back to the period before World War II,
recent developments in economic theory now make it possible to bring the two
groups of scholars together in writing a new kind of business history. In this
introduction we first detail the history ofrelations between economic and busi-
ness historians from the early twentieth century on. We then outline some as-
pects ofthe new theory that, we believe, will further interdisciplinary research
in business history and make the work ofbusiness historians more interesting
to the larger community ofeconomists and historians. This book is the third in
a series. The essays collected in this volume, as in the previous two (Temin
1991; Lamoreaux and Raff 1995), were originally presented at a conference
organized to bring business and economic historians together. They are con-
crete examples of the kind of theoretically informed business history that we
are promoting. Hence we conclude our introduction by situating this volume
relative to the previous two and highlighting the contributions made by the
individual essays toward a more complete understanding ofhow businesses~
and other organizations-have functioned in the past.
Economic History and Business History
The field ofeconomic history had its formal beginning in the United States
in 1892 when Harvard created a chair in the subject and appointed British
scholar William J. Ashley to fill it. A number of other universities followed
Harvard's example and established similar chairs during the last decade ofthe
nineteenth century. After the First World War, a new generation of economic
historians assumed positions of leadership, and the field began a period of
rapid growth. One of the most important of the new scholars was Edwin F.
Gay, who had replacedAshley at Harvard and who went on to lend his prestige
and energies to a major program of institution building. Among the fruits of
his efforts were the National Bureau ofEconomic Research, the Commission
on Recent Economic Changes, the Commission on Recent Social Trends, and
the Social Science Research Council. Underlying all of these organizations
was Gay's belief that research in economic history, particularly the careful
amassing oflong-term quantitative data sets, would provide a vital foundation
for both historical understanding and policy making. For similar reasons, Gay
believed that it was important for archives to collect business papers, and he
helped to found an association devoted to this end, the Business History Soci-
ety. One ofhis students, N. S. B. Gras, the first Strauss Professor of Business
History at the Harvard Business School, became a leader ofthe new subfield of
business history; and from 1928 to 1931, Gay and Gras co-edited the Journalof3 Introduction
Economic and Business History, which aimed to bring together work in both
subject areas (Sass 1986, 15, 29-43~ Cole 1968, 558-59).
This collaborative effort soon foundered, however, over the very different
conceptions the two men had about the direction that scholarship in business
history should take. Gay and other economic historians at the time believed
that business history should contribute to the synthetic view ofeconomic his-
tory they were seeking to construct-that it was precisely because businesses
were subjected to the discipline ofthe market that their records could provide
insight into larger economic processes. Gras, on the other hand, had little use
for the type of theorizing that characterized the more established field. He
was a rigidly inductive thinker who believed that business behavior should
be studied for its own sake, and that new generalizations would ultimately
emerge from case studies amassed by scholars doing highly focused research
on particular enterprises. He and Gay disagreed vehemently about the amount
ofsuch work the journal should publish, and the two men (and their respective
fields) became increasingly estranged. Gay resigned his editorial position in
1931, and the journal folded the next year (Sass 1986,42-45; Heaton 1952,
194).
Although Gras had a number offollowers, many scholars interested in the
study of business history soon grew frustrated with the particularism of his
approach; and for a time, it seemed as if there would be a reconciliation of
business and economic history. Economists like Arthur H. Cole, whose work
fell within both subdisciplines, led a new wave of organization building that
culminated in the 1940s with the founding of the Economic History Associa-
tion, the Council for Research in Economic History, and the Center for Re-
search in Entrepreneurial History at Harvard (Heaton 1941, 1965; Sass 1986,
54-59). As the history of the center illustrates, however, whatever reconcilia-
tion occurred was short-lived.
Scholars at the center were interested in reinjecting theory into the study
of business history. Their starting point was Joseph Schumpeter's concept of
entrepreneurship as a creative act that shifted the economy's production possi-
bility frontier outward in a discontinuous fashion (Schumpeter 1934). Entre-
preneurship was an important subject to study, they argued, because this kind
ofcreativity was the key to sustained improvements in social well-being. How-
ever, Schumpeter himself was unable to explain why some societies at some
times produGe disproportionate numbers of entrepreneurs. Neoclassical price
theory also appeared to lack answers to such questions, and so scholars at the
center turned instead to sociological (particularly Parsonian) models ofhuman
behavior in order to understand why some cultures seem to offer particularly
fertile ground for entrepreneurial innovation. The work of the most important
historians associated with the center-David Landes, Thomas Cochran, and
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., are good examples-consistently employed concepts
and addressed debates at the heart of this sociological literature, even when4 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
they did not make extensive use ofits rather arcane vocabulary and categories
ofanalysis. I
Parsons's approach to the study of society was essentially an equilibrium
one, and there was nothing inherently incompatible between the broad synthe-
ses of business history developed by scholars at the center and the work of
economic historians trained in economics. In recent years, indeed, economists
as prominent as Oliver Williamson and David Teece have found much to ad-
mire in Chandler's model ofthe evolution ofbusiness organizations (William-
son 1981; Teece 1993).2 But circumstances at the time made the differences
seem more important than they actually were. During the early 1950s, concern
about the causes ofunderdevelopment in large parts ofthe world led to heated
debates about the role ofentrepreneurship in industrialization. On the positive
side, ofcourse, were scholars at the center. The negative side was championed
by Alexander Gerschenkron, also of Harvard, who in this debate stressed the
role ofnatural-resource endowments, income levels, and the size ofthe domes-
tic market (Abramovitz and David 1996, 50-57). The spirit of the negative
view was essentially that of neoclassical economics, and Gerschenkron's stu-
dents, along with those of the equally prominent economist Simon Kuznets,
formed the vanguard ofwhat came to be known as the New Economic History
(or sometimes cliometrics), a brand ofscholarship committed to the systematic
application of neoclassical economic theory and formal hypothesis testing to
the study ofthe past.3
The young scholars who led the cliometrics movement disparaged the im-
portance of heroic individuals and so, ipso facto, the entire topic of entrepre-
neurial history. Douglass North, for example, famously downgraded the role
of the entrepreneur in his Economic Growth ofthe United States. Entrepre-
neurs, he argued, did little more than respond to opportunities to maximize
profits; their role was essentially passive. If Eli Whitney had not invented the
cotton gin, someone else would have: "The growing dilemma ofthe South was
that the demand for its traditional export staples was no longer increasing and
its heavy capital investment was in slaves.... [I]nvention ofthe cotton gin can
be viewed as a response to the dilemma rather than as an independent acciden-
tal development" (North 1961, 8, 52). Technological innovation 'Nas induced
by changes in relative prices-that is, by market-driven opportunities for
profit. There was no reason to devote time or resources to studying the entre-
preneurial function in American business.
1. This search for theory often took the form of written scholarly debate in the pages of the
center's in-house journal, Explorations in Entrepreneurial Hist,ory. For a study of the process by
which participants turned to Parsonian sociology, see Sass (1986, 107-223). For an analysis ofthe
utility of this body of theory from someone associated for a time with the center, see Galambos
(1969).
2. In addition, the faculty ofthe Graduate School ofBusiness ofthe University ofChicago, well
known for their orthodox economic views, awarded Chandler the Melamed Award for his book
Scale and Scope.
3. For a more extended treatment ofthese opposing views, see Lamoreaux (1998).5 Introduction
As the cliometricians grew in strength and came increasingly to dominate
the Economic History Association, business historians gradually abandoned
that organization in favor of a recently formed alternative. The Business His-
tory Conference had its origin in a series ofmeetings, beginning at Northwest-
ern in 1954, that brought together economic and business historians who were
rebelling, again, against the atheoretical type ofscholarship promoted by Gras.
The group met twice in 1954, once in 1956, once in 1958, and then yearly
thereafter; and in 1971 it transformed itself into a full-fledged professional
association with dues, officers, a board of trustees, and a journal (albeit one
that published only a single issue a year). Although many ofits original mem-
bers were economists and the association was initially formed to bring econo-
mists and historians together, from the 1970s on the conference increasingly
served to provide historians fleeing the cliometric revolution with a new orga-
nizational base.4
To the present day, the Business History Conference is dominated by trained
historians, whereas the Economic History Association is controlled by trained
economists. Despite large areas ofcommon interest, the professional reference
groups, not to mention the norms about what constitutes interesting questions,
pertinent evidence, and persuasive argument, sometimes seem alarmingly dif-
ferent. Moreover, in the absence of a compelling new interdisciplinary effort,
this divergence seems likely to endure. The purpose of the conferences we
have organized is to make such an effort and to bring business and economic
historians together once again. It is our contention that recent developments in
economic theory provide a historic opportunity for greater communication,
and we think that the essays that resulted from these conferences show the new
interdisciplinary approach to be uncommonly promising.
Beyond Traditional Neoclassical Economics
When today's business historians react negatively to the idea ofusing eco-
nomic theory in their work, they typically have in mind a type of standard
neoclassical modeling that no longer plays much of a role in advanced re-
search. This older tradition dominated the discipline during the 1960s and
1970s, at the very time when the split between economic and business histori-
ans became embodied in rival organizations, and it is still taught in the eco-
nomics courses that many budding historians take (and dislike) as undergradu-
ates. Although the misconception is therefore understandable, the result has
4. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., opposed the move to transform the Business History Conference into
a formal organization because he did not want to abandon the Economic History Association to
the cliometricians. His point of view did not prevail, however (videotape of "Heritage Session,"
consisting of informal remarks by Harold F. Williamson, Sr., Donald Kemmerer, Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr., and Wayne Broehl [reading comments from Thomas Cochran], 34thAnnual Meeting
ofthe Business History Conference, Atlanta, 1988). We would like to thank William Hausman for
providing us with a copy ofthis tape. We are also basing this account on the recollections ofLouis
Cain, communicated to Naomi Lamoreaux in an email message of 18 January 1996.6 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
been to leave historians largely uninformed about recent work in economics,
in particular the extent to which theorists have abandoned the neoclassical as-
sumption that all economic actors make decisions on the basis ofperfect infor-
mation. Economists have now begun instead to reconceptualize the world as a
place where information is scarce, imperfect, and costly, where bounds to the
rationality ofhuman beings affect their economic decision making, where in-
stitutional structures evolve in response to problems ofimperfect information,
and where economic processes can have multiple outcomes depending on both
participants' past experiences and their perceptions of each other's actions.
This new thinking has made economic theory much more useful for the writing
ofbusiness history and vice versa.
Although traditional neoclassical economics purported to offer a "theory of
the firm," in fact it was not centrally about firms. The neoclassical approach
put the market at the core of the analysis and focused attention primarily on
the determination of equilibrium prices and transacted quantities. Firms as
such figured in the analysis only in such detail as was necessary to make the
models ofmarkets work. This treatment was no different from that which the
theory accorded to othereconomic actors, but because firms typically are com-
plex organizations composed of people who often have conflicting interests
and goals, the effect was particularly unworldly. Neoclassical theory endowed
firms with perfect knowledge ofthe marginal benefits and costs attached to all
possible actions and with the ability to act both instantaneously and effectively.
Whereas consumers were portrayed as maximizing utility, a concept that at
least paid lip service to the idea that human beings may have different prefer-
ences, firms were depicted as maximizing the more objective concept of
profits. Indeed, neoclassical theory treated firms as little more than equation-
solving entities that, given market prices, determined output by equalizing
marginal revenue and marginal cost.
Neoclassical economics' single-minded focus on markets, however, was not
without its advantages. One important strength was its ability to tie the behav-
ior ofindividuals and firms directly to competitive processes so as to highlight
the disciplinary impact ofthe market. Another was the way in which it linked
the actions of economic actors to a rigorously defined concept of social wel-
fare. Competition was efficient in the sense that it led to a Pareto-optimal equi-
librium-thatis, to a situation where it was impossible to make anyone person
better offwithout making at least one other person worse off.5
More recent work has aimed at correcting some of the deficiencies of neo-
classical theory's restrictive focus on market competition without losing all of
5. This statement is known as the fundamental theorem ofwelfare economics and can be found
in any elementary microeconomics text. It is ofmore than abstract importance, as it has provided,
for example, the intellectual basis for the recent deregulation movement. Critics ofthis view typi-
cally do not dispute the notion that competitive equilibrium is efficient in a static sense, but instead
point out that Pareto efficiency is often achieved at the cost of a high degree of social inequality
because there is nothing in these market processes that can correct an unequal initial distribution
ofincome and wealth.7 Introduction
its advantages. The new research has progressed in a number ofdirections, and
we summarized some of these (particularly principal-agent and transaction-
cost analysis) in ourprevious volumes.
6 In the presentessay, we focus on devel-
opments that explore the ways in which firms (and other organizations) learn:
the role past experience plays in deciding what should be done in a world
in which information is imperfect; how different firms, even within the same
industry, can learn different things; and how the results ofthese varied learning
processes can come to be embodied in individual firms' practices and struc-
tures, so that there is a great deal of persistent heterogeneity, even within a
given industry.
The least formal and (to historians) most accessible version ofthis theory is
the so-called evolutionary economics developed by Richard Nelson and Sid-
ney Winter (1982). Although Nelson and Winter do not scrap the role ofmarket
discipline in their model, they place human actions, rather than relatively ab-
stractmarket mechanisms, squarely at the centeroftheir analysis. In their view,
decision makers within firms want to maximize profits, but they do so by mak-
ing choices in a trial-and-error and decidedly not omniscient fashion. One way
of thinking about these choices is to imagine a decision maker considering
what the value should be of some decision variable that he or she controls.
How should the decision maker proceed? An optimizing but not omniscient
actor might begin with the status quo and perform an incremental analysis.
Would a small change in the value (in some particular direction) ofa variable
he or she controls increase profits? If the answer appears to be yes, the next
step would be to repeat the exercise based on the new value. If the answer
appears to be no, the decision maker would try an equally incremental change
in the opposite direction. If the answer in both directions is no, the decision
maker would stick with the status quo.
From the neoclassical perspective, this model of understanding decision
making might appear to be little more than an explication ofhow firms get to
equilibrium prices and quantities. But the difference in emphasis that is im-
plicit in this focus on actions (as opposed to outcomes) has profound implica-
tions for what the student offirms ought to study. The reason is that the action-
based approach immediately draws attention away from markets and market
mechanisms in and of themselves and instead focuses it on such important
questions as what decision makers actually know and how what they know
affects what they do. The critical assumption that the evolutionary economists
make-the assumption that distinguishes them most dramatically from their
neoclassical predecessors-is that decision makers within firms in fact know
very little about the opportunities and costs of unfamiliar or new procedures
and activities. They have to feel their way along.
Because the level ofuncertainty is so high, choices that yield positive out-
6. See the introductions to Temin (1991) and Lamoreaux and Raff (1995), and especially Raff
and Temin, "Business History and Recent Economic Theory," in the former, 7-40.8 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
comes often become embedded in the routines and organizational culture of
enterprises. A business does something in a particular way and achieves good
results. It then attempts to build on its success by exploiting this experience. It
finds that expanding the same or similar practices to other areas in an incre-
mental way is a profitable thing to do, in part because it has already mastered
these practices. As a result, past ways ofdoing things gradually come to play
a greater and greater role in the operations of the enterprise. This process of
institutionalizing previous achievements can make it difficult for firms to re-
spond to challenges that require them to operate in novel ways, but it can also
be an important source ofcompetitive advantage. Rivals may find a firm's suc-
cess difficult to imitate because the routines in question depend to a very con-
siderable extent on firm-specific knowledge and experiences. Successful imita-
tion can involve replicating not only a product or production process but also
the entire organizational environment that generated and sustained the innova-
tion. It is often extremely difficult for other firms even to learn the outward
details ofwhat is required, let alone understand what underlies them.
The implications ofthis approach are thus very different from those ofstan-
dard neoclassical theory. Under conventional assumptions, the neoclassical
"theory ofthe firm" yields one global optimum-thatis, one equilibrium level
ofprices and output toward which firms' incremental trial-and-error decision-
making processes will inevitably push them. Competitive pressures force all
enterprises to move toward the least-cost method of production-toward a
technologically defined best practice. Otherwise they fail. On the other hand,
the more action- and knowledge-oriented approach associated with evolution-
ary economics leaves open the possibility that firms' myopic decision-making
processes may leave them in positions that are local, rather than global, optima.
Where a firm ends up depends on where it started-on status quo ante deci-
sions and patterns already established. From this perspective, a firm's costs are
a function not only ofthe technology it employs but also ofthe organizational
routines that put that technology to work. Competitive pressures still operate
to keep firms on their toes, but successful firms, even within the same industry,
can differ strikingly in ways that are remarkably persistent over time. Under-
standing the sources of such variation-and hence the nature of industrial
competition itself-therefore requires both a general understanding of how
economic actors are likely to behave under conditions ofimperfect information
and the ability to track the ways in which enterprises build up firm-specific
routines and capabilities over time. In other words, it requires us to marry the
time-tested methods of historical inquiry with insights from new theoretical
developments in economics.
More formal versions ofthe new theory take as their starting point George
Stigler's formulation ofknowledge as an economic good (1964). Like all eco-
nomic goods, knowledge has a cost, and so people and firms are only willing
to acquire it if they expect its marginal benefit to exceed its marginal cost.
Because it is common for the former to fall short ofthe latter, individuals and9 Introduction
firms often make decisions without the full range ofpotentially available rele-
vant information. Whereas the analysis described above simply assumes that
almost all relevant information is costly for all actors, these more formal alter-
natives allow for the possibility that groups may possess varying amounts and
qualities of information because the costs they face in obtaining knowledge
differ.
There has been a tremendous growth in recent years in the number and types
of models that aim to elucidate the implications for organizational behavior
and competitive outcomes of such differences in the cost and possession of
information. Economics journals are full of papers embodying new assump-
tions that generate novel solutions. But the richness ofthis literature is also its
Achilles' heel, because it gives the appearance that anything can happen in the
absence of good-that is, cheap-information. Of course, this impression is
false-there are many constraints operating to limit the choices that actors
make. At the simplest level, the desire to pay one's bills or make a profit can
limit the number of actions that seem wise; similarly, competitive forces can
constrain the alternatives that are reasonable to take. Nonetheless, eliminating
more than the most obviously unrealistic models requires concerted scholarly
effort. Economists have approached this problem by refining their theoretical
apparatus, but they have also begun to analyze real-world examples-actual
company histories-for insight into the nature ofthe information that matters
both for firm and market behavior (Gibbons 1997).
Business history is an obvious place for economists to tum for assistance.
But in order for business historians to provide theorists with this kind ofintel-
lectual discipline, they have to communicate the import of their findings in a
way that economists can appreciate. As the essays in this volume show, there
is no requirement that historians adopt formal theoretical approaches in their
work or even that they weave their narratives around abstract economic mod-
els. All that is necessary is that they share with economists a few fundamental
assumptions about how human beings behave. Too often, historians have re-
acted to the limitations ofthe neoclassical approach by attacking the notion of
economic rationality itself-by challenging the idea that at its heart economic
behavioris fundamentally a matter ofweighing the expectedoutcomes ofalter-
native decisions,in a systematic fashion. But this is throwing out the baby with
the bath water. One does not have to assume that economic actors are all-
knowing to believe that they make the most advantageous choices they can on
the basis ofthe limited information they possess. Thanks to recent theoretical
developments, economists are now employing a more commonsensical notion
ofrationality-onethat business historians should be able to embrace without
doing violence to any oftheir deeply held beliefs about the importance ofcon-
text, ideas, or culture. As a result, historians can offer economists intellectual
discipline simply by focusing their efforts on what they are well-trained to do:
elucidating what economic actors actually know at any given point in time,
how they use their knowledge to make informed choices, and how they learn10 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
from their past decisions. In short, there is now the opportunity for renewed
dialogue between those who analyze business decisions at an abstract level
(economists) and those who analyze them in their individual, concrete, and
idiosyncratic variety (historians)-dialoguethat will not only help economists
improve their modeling but will also provide stimulating new questions for
historians to explore in their research.
Contents ofthe Current Volume
The two previous volumes in this series essentially asked the question,
"What goes on inside firms?" They advanced the answer that business leaders
have been centrally preoccupied with the management of information flows
and asymmetries (situations where one party in a relationship has more or bet-
ter information than another). The individual essays dealt with subjects as
widely disparate as small watchmakers versus large automobile firms, or local
mortgage banks versus investment behemoths like J. P. Morgan and Company,
but they can be grouped into three broad categories. The first group traced
efforts by business leaders to improve their knowledge ofsubordinates' activi-
ties, the second analyzed the ways in which alternative organizational arrange-
ments could reduce informational asymmetries, and the third showed how
legal and regulatory constraints could affect business's ability to cope with
information problems. The collective impact ofthe essays was to demonstrate
that many characteristic features ofmodern business organizations can be un-
derstood in terms ofthe scarcity and value ofinformation.
Although some of the essays in the previous volumes dealt with learning
processes, the present volume moves this theme to center stage by asking ex-
plicitly how firms, industries, and even nations can learn to overcome uncer-
tainty. It shows that organizations-like people-learn different things in dif-
ferent ways and that this variation has implications for competitive outcomes.
The essays in this volume thus mark a transition from focusing on problems
that are common to a whole class of firms or industries to explaining why
firms, groups, and nations can differ in important and persistent ways.
The essays in the first part ofthe volume explore some ofthe techniques that
firms employ to create competitively valuable informational asymmetries and
at the same time prevent unfavorable ones from arising. The starting point is
the observation that the amount ofinformation firms possess depends upon the
extent to which they invest in collecting it. In "Inventors, Firms, and the Market
for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," Naomi
Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff argue that an, active market for patented
inventions developed over the course of the nineteenth century. In the "high-
tech" parts ofthe economy in particular, firms seeking to stay on the technolog-
ical cutting edge began to devote resources to building staffs of employees
whose main function was acquire to knowledge about inventions developed
outside the firm and decide whether the company should purchase rights to use11 Introduction
them. In an environment where many inventions were protected by patents
and where this kind of property right was vigorously enforced, investment in
collecting information about new developments throughout the economy was
vital to success. A wrong decision about the value ofa patent could mean that
a competitor gained control ofvital technology.
Because investments in c'apabilities ofthis sort were expensive, some firms
turned to organizational substitutes. Many small firms, for example, used pat-
ent solicitors to keep abreast of inventions related to their interests. Although
initially the main purpose ofthese legal representatives was to shepherd appli-
cations through the Patent Office and to defend patentees in i~terference and
infringement proceedings, over time they developed specialized technical ex-
pertise that firms could tap to keep up with developments in the rest of the
economy. Another organizational substitute was the patentpool. As Steven Us-
selman describes in "Patents, Engineering Professionals, and the Pipelines of
Innovation: The Internalization ofTechnical Discovery by Nineteenth-Century
American Railroads," pools were employed by large firms in industries (like
railroads) where there was already a significant amount of interfirm coopera-
tion. They enabled firms to collude in the acquisition ofnew technology. Be-
cause pools insured that all patents would be cross-licensed to participating
firms, they eliminated much ofthe risk that a competitor would monopolize an
essential patent and kept the cost ofinventions low.
Such substitutes for direct investment in information collection could work
quite well so long as most of the important new technological developments
occurred in the external environment. Once internal R&D grew in significance,
however, firms that did not invest in building up research capabilities often
found themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Moreover, once technological
change moved inside firms, its character shifted in important ways. As Ussel-
man suggests, it became focused less on the acquisition of patents and more
on the overall goal of increasing efficiency through systemization and stan-
dardization. Improvements ofthis sort typically involved a great deal of firm-
specific knowledge. Unlike patents, therefore, they could not be traded on the
market.
Although the purpose ofpatent pools was to reduce asymmetries associated
with the acquisition ofnew technologies, firms could also use similarly struc-
tured organizations to alleviate competitive pressures resulting from other
kinds ofinformation problems. For example, with cartels illegal in the United
States after the turn ofthe century, it was in firms' interests to develop alterna-
tive ways ofcoping with price competition. One device that grew in popularity
during the 1920s was the open-price association, the main purpose of which
was the collection and dissemination of information about prices and output.
The idea was that, iffirms had better information about these magnitudes, price
cutting would be easier to detect, and so the incentive to increase market share
by undercutting competitors' prices would be greatly reduced. However, as
David Genesove and Wallace Mullin found in their study ofone such associa-12 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
tion, the Sugar Institute, firms were initially reluctant to make this kind of
information available to competitors. The institute had to learn how to guaran-
tee credibly that data on individual producers would be handled carefully and
confidentially so that competitors would not gain any advantage from the ex-
change. Even so, firms were reluctant to share certain kinds of information,
for example, detailed reports of their sales. At the root of the problem were
informational asymmetries within the organization itself. Firms that were large
relative to the market knew more about what their competitors were doing than
firms that were small, and they were not willing to give up that advantage. This
fundamental inequality in access to information proved impossible to over-
come.
The second group ofessays in this collection focuses on the ways in which
firms built up special capabilities over time, capabilities that could be sources
both of competitive advantage and of resistance to new kinds of learning. In
his reconsideration of learning by doing in the production ofbombers during
World War II, Kazuhiro Mishina describes how Boeing's managers succeeded
in effecting the enormous productivity increases needed to satisfy insistent de-
mands from the military for additional planes. Over a period ofonly four years,
the direct labor time it took to make a B-17 bomber at Boeing declined from
seventy-one worker-years to a mere eight. Mishina shows that the prompt to
productivity growth was not cumulative experience per se, but rather the dra-
matic increases in the flow of production that Boeing had to accommodate.
Boeing's managers learned, in other words, because they were experiencing
extraordinary new pressures on capacity.
Not all firms were able to respond so successfully to these pressures, how-
ever. Boeing's achievement, Mishina shows, resulted from its flexible use of
space and its group assembly techniques. By contrast, Ford attempted to apply
its automobile technology to aircraft production, transferring its mass-
production assembly-line techniques to the manufacture of airplanes. These
methods meant that space in Ford's plants was rigidly partitioned by assembly
lines and dedicated to particular uses, a structure that made it difficult for Ford
to increase its output rapidly in response to the skyrocketing military demand
for planes.
Ford's more rigid system proved disastrous, and the firm emerged from the
Great Depression and World War II nearly bankrupt. To rescue the failing en-
terprise, the new CEO, Henry Ford II, lured a whole team ofexecutives away
from General Motors. The GM people immediately set to work reinventing
Ford along the lines of GM-that is, they set about replacing Ford's highly
centralized organizational structure with the decentralized multidivisional
form used at GM. As David Hounshell's chapter shows, the GM people seemed
to be succeeding in restructuring Ford. In a key vote in late 1949, for example,
the company's top executives approved a plan to build two new engine plants
that would provide the firm with badly needed production capacity and at the
same time further the process ofdecentralization. Less than a month later, how-13 Introduction
ever, the decision was reversed. Although there are no records that reveal what
actually happened at that subsequent meeting, Hounshell goes to great lengths
to elucidate the various possible influences shaping the decision.
Part ofthe explanation for the shift appears to be the difficulty ofthe project
itself. Ford's centralized organizational structure was embodied in physical
capital in the form ofthe huge River Rouge plant in Detroit. As the executives
confronted the costs involved in dismantling the Rouge in order to transform
Ford's organizational structure along GM lines, they seem to have backed away
from the project. Rather than copy GM, Ford instead developed a new business
strategy that made effective use of its own sunk investments in plant and in
particular ways of doing things, a strategy that proved profitable in the next
period.
When firms failed to exploit the capacities they had built up over the years,
the results could be momentous. The case ofSears offers an instructive lesson.
As the chapter by Daniel Raffand PeterTemin argues, Sears faced two impor-
tant turning points during its history-the first in the mid-1920s, and the sec-
ond in the late 1970s. During the first episode, Julius Rosenwald hired General
Robert Wood to add retail stores to Sears's catalogue business. This expansion
made good use ofthe expertise and goodwill that Sears had already accumu-
lated and enabled the firm to hold onto its clientele as families became more
urban, work moved from agriculture into industry, and people increasingly
traveled by car. In the second episode, Sears's executives debated the firm's
future path. One group wanted to follow what it thought to be General Wood's
example and add new dimensions to Sears's retail activities; another group
wanted to revitalize the company's stores. The first group won, and Sears ex-
panded into financial services. But the hoped-for synergy between the sale of
goods, on the one hand, and financial instruments, on the other, did not materi-
alize. More important, the executives' misperception ofthe firm's special capa-
bilities cost the firm many years in its contest with stores like Wal-Mart and
The Gap, stores that increased their market share by using new information
technology to lower prices and improve responsiveness to consumer demand.
The final section ofthe volume extends the notion oflearning from the level
offirms to that ofnations. The idea is that nations, like firms, can make invest-
ments in specific ways oforganizing economic activity-what we call institu-
tions-that give them economic advantages in a world where information is
imperfect and costly. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., has argued that the large-scale
enterprises thatemerged in the United States during the early twentieth century
(in large measure because cartels were illegal here) were responsible for the
extraordinary performance of the U.S. economy (Chandler 1977, 1990). But
Leslie Hannah's essay shows that this view will not withstand empirical scru-
tiny. Hannah tracks the performance of the largest firms in the United States,
Great Britain, and Germany over the course ofthe twentieth century, and finds
that large firms in general and U.S. firms in particularhave not done especially
well. Chandler assumed that managerial control ofvertically integrated enter-14 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
prises provided a coordination mechanism superior to any that could operate
through the market, but this assumption has also been called increasingly into
question.?
Iflarge-scale enterprises do not account for the extraordinary success ofthe
U.S. economy during the early twentieth century, what does? Hannah argues
that the explanationfor long-run national differences in economic performance
must reside eitherin the nonindustrial sectors ofthe economy orin the achieve-
ments of small firms. Rising to the challenge that this kind ofquestion poses,
Gavin Wright has attempted to elucidate the particular "socialcapabilities" that
allowed the United States to move into a position ofworld economic leadership
by 1890.8 In "Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phe-
nomenon," Wright focuses on the networks of people that made possible the
transfer of technological knowledge throughout the nation. During the early
nineteenth century this type ofcommunication was facilitated by the high geo-
graphic mobility oflabor, particularly the movement ofskilled mechanics with
a great deal of technological know-how. Over the course of the century, how-
ever, these networks became more formal as technological change increasingly
became the work of engineers with college training and budding professional
identities. The engineers organized themselves into national societies devoted
to the promotion of their fields and spread their brand of specialized knowl-
edge to like-minded people in other parts ofthe country.
Perhaps the most important ofthese networks centered on the mining indus-
try. One common explanation for the U.S. economy's extraordinary perfor-
mance by the early twentieth century was its abundant raw material resources,
but Wright shows that the nation's share of resource production during this
period greatly exceeded what we now know to be its share of reserves. What
accounted for the superior U.S. performance, he argues, was not resources per
se, but the capacity to exploit them that the nation had acquired through its
network ofmining engineers. The important lesson to take away from this ex-
ample, then, is that nations like firms have business histories. That is, we can
understand their success by studying the special organizational and institu-
tional arrangements they developed to exploit informational asymmetries.
Conclusions
The three volumes we have published, and especially this last collection of
essays, demonstrate through myriad examples that information is crucial to
economic success. More than any other factor, the ability to collect and use
7. For example, Michael Enright (1995) has shown that small vertically disintegrated but geo-
graphically concentrated firms can develop coordination mechanisms that are superior to manage-
rial hierarchies in their flexibility to respond to changes in consumer demand. Similar arguments
about the advantages of clusters of small vertically disintegrated firms over large managerially
directed enterprises have been made by scholars as diverse as Michael Piore and Charles Sabel
(1984) and Philip Scranton (1983, 1989).
8. See also David and Wright (1992); Abramovitz and David (1996).15 Introduction
information effectively determines whether firms, industry groups, and even
nations will succeed orfail. There are several more subtle points to underscore,
however. First, although it is obviously important for firms and other organiza-
tions to learn about the external environment (for example, about market op-
portunities and technological developments), it is equally important that they
be introspective-that is, tHat they devote resources to learning about the ca-
pabilities that their own ongoing operations are creating and to understanding
the opportunities that are evolving as a result. Second, the outcome of these
learning processes, especially the introspective ones, may well be quite
firm-specific. As a result, economic organizations ranging from firms to na-
tions may develop special capabilities that distinguish them in striking ways
from the other organizations with which they compete. Finally, although the
essays in these volumes have dealt with many very specific subjects and indeed
have highlighted the idiosyncratic aspects ofthe individual firms and organiza-
tions studied, the essays nonetheless have an underlying coherence. All ofthe
authors take the imperfect state of information as their starting point, and all
aim to illuminate the ways in which this condition effects the playing out of
economic life. This common preoccupation then leads to a deeper source of
coherence-the structural unity behind all these various topics. The informa-
tion problems that firms face in their internal operations are not so different
from those that they face in dealing with the external environment or from
those faced by firms and other economic actors when they interact with one
another. Further, the solutions adopted in response to these information prob-
lems typically have many features in common, even though they often result
in the creation of capabilities that are specific to the organization. In sharp
contrast, therefore, to the case studies that characterized the Grasian tradition
ofbusiness history, the essays in these volumes contribute to a coherent view
ofAmerican economic development and organizational change.9
Fruitful exploration of these underlying ideas depends first and foremost
upon genuine interaction between economists and business historians. These
two groups of scholars do different things. Business historians are primarily
interested in understanding changes over time in the behavior and structure of
particular economic organizations. Economists are primarily concerned with
building general models ofeconomic relationships and with exploring the im-
plications ofthe models they build. Despite their very different interests, how-
ever, the two groups ofscholars have much to gain from intellectual exchange.
As we have already suggested, business historians can turn to economic theory
for intriguing new questions and for the light a coherent perspective sheds on
an otherwise untidy past. On the other hand, business history can offer econo-
mists useful correctives and provocative examples that will inspire them to give
their models heightened realism and greater practical significance. Business
decisions, after all, are not abstract optimization exercises. They are embedded
9. For such a summary view, see Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin (1997).16 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and PeterTemin
in contexts. Moreover, because past choices condition future ones, the study
ofthese contexts has an important historical dimension-capabilities built up
slowly over time affect firms' evaluation (and ability to take advantage) ofnew
possibilities. Hence it is really only by marrying historical methods with in-
sights from the new economic theory-by making business history truly inter-
disciplinary-that scholars can obtain a full understanding of the nature and
determinants ofcompetition and the sources ofeconomic success.
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